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Anarchy’s Anatomy: Two-Tiered Security Systems and Libya’s Civil Wars 
No issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest 
unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution—two-tiered security systems—
are particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These 
systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked 
units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed 
forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks 
because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but 
inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, 
fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were 
recruited.  







Perhaps no security issue deserves more scrutiny than the risk of revolutions 
provoking civil wars. Liberal democracies normatively support, at least in principle, 
populations’ efforts to unseat authoritarian rulers. Many revolutions, however, give way 
to civil wars rather than democratic consolidation. When protracted wars follow 
revolutions they kill more individuals and generate greater disruption than the revolutions 
themselves. Even once one side prevails, many post-revolutionary states succumb to 
further civil wars, which inflict additional damage.  
A growing body of scholarship explores how civil-military institutions shape 
military responses to uprisings. Building on this literature, we argue that how pre-
revolutionary governments institutionalize their monopolies on violence impacts both 
whether mass protests catalyze civil wars and whether post-revolutionary governments 
face further civil war risks. One particular institution—two-tiered security systems—is 
particularly poor at coping with transitions in power. Two-tiered systems juxtapose 
communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger 
regular forces that recruit more broadly and defend states from external opponents.  
We argue, however, that although two-tiered systems are a rational response to 
the threats many authoritarian regimes face, they create acute and recurrent civil war risks 
whenever popular contestation escalates beyond a certain threshold. Such is the case 
because two-tiered systems are difficult for revolutionaries to swiftly unseat, yet lack the 
force needed to repress widespread uprisings. Stacked units generally fight for their 
regimes and prevent regular units from supplanting governments by coup d’état. These 
forces, however, lack the size to repress massive dissent. Regular forces, meanwhile, are 
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likely to fracture when governments order them to employ indiscriminant violence 
against populations from which they were recruited.  
Mass protests plunge two-tiered systems into civil war when regular units reassess 
their loyalties, yet regime protection units fight on. States with such systems are also 
prone to follow-on civil wars after anti-regime forces triumph because of the likely 
fragmentation of their post-revolutionary security environments. Within the victorious 
rebel coalition, defectors from the regular armed forces and civilian insurgents will vie 
for power and resist integration into a new national military. The remnants of the previous 
regime’s stacked units will also likely challenge the new regime whenever they possess 
the requisite firepower. 
 
The Military Loyalty Problématique 
A monopoly on force within a territory has long been considered critical to 
modern states. Max Weber posited that an entity could only be defined as a state when it 
‘successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in 
the enforcement of its order.’1 While few disagree with Weber, there is no consensus as 
to what types of force states must possess. In principle, regimes need force for some 
combination of the following: 1) quelling domestic unrest; 2) defending against foreign 
adversaries; and 3) protecting the regime from a coup d’état.  
Scholars since the 2011 Arab Spring have shed new light on when militaries 
loyally execute the first mission. One popular explanation attributes variations in 
behavior to whether armed forces are ‘institutionalized’ or ‘patrimonial’. According to 
                                                 
1 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free 
Press 1964), 154. 
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Eva Bellin, institutionalized militaries exist independently from regimes and can 
therefore accept the latters’ fall. By way of contrast, clientelistic ties connect patrimonial 
militaries to regimes to such a degree that the former cannot subsist without the latter.2 
Holger Albrecht extends this dichotomy to officers’ self-enrichment, with institutional 
militaries providing revenues independent of the regime and patrimonial ones connecting 
officers to the regime via the executive’s provision of rents.3 
Despite its plausibility, the institutional/patrimonial dichotomy provides an 
imperfect metric. To begin with, the institutional/patrimonial dichotomy cannot account 
for the range of outcomes—including militaries obeying governments, turning against 
them, splintering and provoking post-revolutionary civil wars—observed during the Arab 
Spring. Michael Makara suggests that the dichotomy also over-simplifies a range of 
practices, such as communal stacking policies and the creation of parallel militaries.4 
Many militaries, indeed, combine institutional and patrimonial characteristics. 
Patrimonialism can, for example, dictate senior appointments or determine elite units’ 
recruitments even in militaries otherwise organized along institutional lines. Furthermore, 
as Alejandro Pachon demonstrates, states structure their militaries in response to 
particular threat matrices.5 To understand how any military will behave, scholars must 
therefore examine the historic processes by which the state developed security 
institutions.  
                                                 
2 Eva Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Lessons from the Arab Spring’, Comparative Politics 44/2 (2012) 127-49. 
3 Holger Albrecht, ‘Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in 
Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings’, Mediterranean Politics 20/1 (2015) 36-
54. 
4 Michael Makara, ‘Rethinking Military Behavior During the Arab Spring’, 
Defense & Security Analysis 32/3 (2016) 209-223. 
5 Alejandro Pachon, ‘Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military 




Designing institutions appropriate to the precise threats that a state faces is, 
however, a fraught process. Modern bureaucratized militaries evolved broad-based forms 
of recruitment and functionally distinct branches in Western Europe for the primarily 
purpose of defending states against external threats.6 Such militaries are suboptimal, 
however, for suppressing uprisings or preventing coups. Fear of challenges such as these 
drive many regimes to depart from this model by offering expanded benefits to the officer 
corps in exchange for loyalty vis-à-vis domestic adversaries. Governments can increase 
the high command’s contentedness by expanding its autonomy, allowing generals to 
determine promotions and determine defense-spending priorities.  
Taken to an extreme, this can involve regimes sharing power with the military and 
according them formal seats in ruling councils.7 Material incentives—in the form of high 
defense budgets, elevated salaries and business opportunities—can further cement the 
military’s loyalty.8 Governments can furthermore develop security services, ranging from 
riot police to secret police, to disengage the armed forces from domestic tasks that they 
dislike and for which they are unsuited.9 Authoritarians from Indonesia’s Hajji Suharto 
to Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak applied these techniques to ensure long periods of stable 
governance.10  
                                                 
6 Otto Hintze, ‘Military Organization and the Organization of the State’, in Felix 
Gilbert (ed.), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford UP 1975), 175-
215. 
7 Terence Lee, Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in 
Authoritarian Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2015), 22-59. 
8 Zeinab Abul-Magd, Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business and Revolution 
in Egypt (New York: Columbia UP 2016), 1-165. 
9 Yezid Sayigh, ‘Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces’, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 43/3 (2011) 403-05. 




Substantial drawbacks accompany such measures however. To secure a military’s 
loyalty in this way requires governments to cede resources and make policy concessions 
such that the military dominates the state without governing it.11  When such militaries 
repress discontent, they often exploit the occasions to expand their perquisites. Weber 
postulated this dynamic in his “paradox of the sultan” wherein an autocrat’s reliance on 
force leads commanders to regard themselves as the real source of the regime’s 
authority.12 Even so, material incentives often prove insufficient guarantees of military 
loyalty in the face of uprisings since officers recognize that they will suffer retribution if 
they follow governmental orders, yet the regime nonetheless collapses. Displacing 
regimes will consequently often better serve armed forces’ interests than supporting 
them.13    
Many regimes resolve such problems by stacking their officer corps with members 
of the President’s ethnic group.14 Prior studies demonstrate that stacking the officer corps’ 
upper and middle ranks mitigates coup risk because officers are reluctant to overthrow 
regimes that benefit them disproportionately.15 This form of stacking is hardly a panacea 
though. For one thing, stacking the officer corps cannot guarantee enlisted personnel’s 
obedience in repressing uprisings. As Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan demonstrate, 
uprisings overthrow regimes when rank-and-file soldiers defect rather than fire upon 
                                                 
11 Steven Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political 
Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 2007). 
12 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 
1 (Berkeley: University of California 1978), 231-32. 
13 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid 
Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2010), 56-61. 
14 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of 
California 2000 [second edition]), 443-562. 
15 Philip Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in 




protestors.16 Worse still, stacking an officer corps’ higher echelons increases the 
likelihood that resentful junior officers or non-commissioned officers will attempt coups. 
Although Naunihal Singh shows that such “coups from below” are less likely to succeed, 
they nonetheless account for one-sixth of coup attempts and nine percent of successful 
coups.17  
Regimes can guard against these threats by adopting a more comprehensive form 
of stacking, wherein they fill the enlisted ranks as well with members of the President’s 
community. In principle, this should reinforce the military’s willingness to suppress 
unrest and reduce the incentives for any military faction to attempt a coup by aligning the 
interests of junior officers and rank-and-file personnel with those of the regime. 
Governments, such as André Kolingba’s in the Central African Republic (1981-1993) 
and Paul Kagame’s in Rwanda (1994-present), employed this form of stacking to insulate 
their minority governments. Jordan’s stacking of combat units almost exclusively from 
trans-Jordanian Bedouin constitutes a prominent Middle Eastern example of this form of 
stacking.18  
Comprehensively stacking militaries along these lines hinges, however, on armed 
forces remaining small relative to the state’s population. Such stacking becomes 
problematic as militaries grow larger and is impossible for states that rely on 
conscription.19 Such is the case for many Middle Eastern and North African states, where 
                                                 
16 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The 
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia UP 2011), 1-84. 
17 Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 2014), 41-78. 
18 Rolf Schwarz, War and State Building in the Middle East (Gainesville: Florida 
UP 2012), 58-74. 
19 James Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle 
East’, International Security 24/2 (1999) 131-65. 
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inter-state threats drive regimes to maintain large militaries.20 Other factors can prevent 
less militarized states from embracing comprehensive stacking as well. Governments may 
fail to recruit enough personnel from the President’s group in states where enlisted service 
enjoys little prestige, a condition prevalent in post-colonial Africa. External partners—
whether states providing security assistance or organizations offering peacekeeping 
contracts—may also dissuade governments from such discrimination within the armed 
forces. 
 
Two-Tiered Security Systems and Civil War 
Many authoritarians therefore find themselves in a position where ordinary 
stacking offers insufficient protection against uprisings and comprehensive stacking is 
impractical. What we term two-tiered security systems constitute a pragmatic and 
oftentimes effective strategy for these states to meet their security needs. One component 
of such systems are communally stacked units designed to protect regimes against dissent. 
These well-resourced units possess the firepower to suppress modest uprisings and can 
thwart coups by preventing regular units from seizing important buildings and 
communications facilities.21 They are, however, too small to fight foreign wars. 
Governments therefore also maintain larger conventional forces. Although doubtfully 
reliable against domestic opponents, these forces reliably defend states from invasion. 
Two-tiered systems are distinct from the related coup-proofing technique of 
“counterbalancing.”22 Whereas counterbalancing divides militaries into rival 
                                                 
20 Jan Grebe and Max Mutschler (eds.), Global Militarisation Index 2015 (Bonn: 
BICC, 2015) <https://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/global-
militarisation-index-2015-627/>. 
21 Theodore McLauchlin, ‘Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in 
Rebellion’, Comparative Politics 42/3 (2010) 333-50. 
22 Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing’, 131-65. 
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organizations that check and balance one another, two-tiered systems rely on communal 
ties to ensure elite units’ reliability. Therefore, while states from Brazil to Russia engage 
in counterbalancing, only regimes with an explicitly communal power base can develop 
two-tiered systems. Likewise, while counterbalancing reduces coups’ success rates by 
incentivizing some soldiers to defend the regime, two-tiered systems leverage communal 
ties to further bolster stacked units’ willingness to fight.23 
While two-tiered systems’ ability to counter internal and external threats renders 
them attractive to many regimes, there are reasons for anticipating that such systems 
inhibit states from peacefully accommodating radical change. Prior scholarship, indeed, 
suggests that such regimes should be particularly vulnerable to recurrent civil wars. Since 
even less extensive forms of stacking augment civil war risks, two-tiered systems should 
further increase grievance-based civil wars’ likelihood because they entail a higher degree 
of ethnic exclusion, with security units’ enlisted ranks being stacked as well as the officer 
corps.24 Mass protests, within this context, generate circumstances that plunge states into 
civil war by obliging governments to call upon regular forces once uprisings’ scope 
exceed stacked units’ repressive capacity. Ordering broadly recruited units to repress 
demonstrations is, however, risky because soldiers often defect and regular officers resent 
stacked units’ privileges.25 Two-tiered systems are therefore liable to disaggregate, with 
security units protecting the regime and the military fracturing. 
                                                 
23 Erica De Bruin, ‘Preventing Coups d’état: How Counterbalancing Works’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2017) at: doi.org/10.1177/0022002717692652 (accessed 
February 2018). 
24 Lars-Erik Cederman et al., Inequality, Grievances and Civil War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP 2013), 57-92. 
25 Hicham Nassif, ‘”Second-Class”: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the 
Syrian Armed Forces’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015) 626-49. 
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The civil war risk posed by two-tiered systems does not vanish, however, with 
successful revolutions. Three legacies of two-tiered systems—fragmented post-
revolutionary security orders, the difficulty of integrating regular and irregular 
combatants, and the likelihood that stacked units’ remnants will contest the new regime—
increase post-revolutionary civil wars’ probability.  
To begin with, military defections to protestors under such systems leave multiple 
armed actors aspiring to dominate post-revolutionary regimes. Such is the case because 
regular forces fragment—with some joining protestors, others avoiding participation and 
others still obeying the government—rather than fighting cohesively for one side. 
Winning rebel coalitions therefore include both defected military units and other 
mobilized social groups. Such rebel fragmentation contributes in and of itself to civil war 
recurrence.26            
Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie demonstrate that governments can reduce 
post-revolutionary civil wars’ probability by integrating combatants into unified national 
militaries.27 Integrating the regular and irregular combatants that co-exist in states that 
previously had two-tiered systems is more difficult than combining more intrinsically 
similar armed factions. The reason for this lies in how individuals acquire authority in 
each type of force. Whereas regular forces promote individuals based on educational 
qualifications, performance reviews and seniority, irregular leaders advance in authority 
due to their charisma and bravery. Fighters often elect their leaders and commanders seek 
consensus when making decisions. These distinct organizational logics render integration 
                                                 
26 Michael Findley and Peter Rudloff, ‘Combattant Fragmentation and the 
Dynamics of Civil Wars’, British Journal of Political Science 42/4 (2012) 879-901. 
27 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power 
Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal of Political 
Science 47/2 (2003) 318-32. 
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fraught. Irregular fighters often balk at military discipline and distrust officers who served 
previous regimes. Regular officers’ devaluation and marginalization of irregulars, whom 
they deem underqualified, is according to David Latin an even greater obstacle to 
integration.28 In the absence of integration, security sectors remain fragmented and civil 
wars probable.      
Stacked units’ remnants pose a third distinct civil war risk. According to Lars-
Erik Cederman, Kristian Gleditsch and Halvard Buhang, civil wars are most likely when 
hitherto privileged communities find themselves excluded from power.29 Such is 
particularly the case when the groups that suffer status inversions are also heavily armed. 
Kristen Harkness demonstrates this hypothesis’ plausibility by showing how militaries 
that have been stacked by one regime often attempt to overthrow succeeding 
governments.30 We may therefore expect that stacked units’ remnants will contest the 
new political order whenever they have the opportunity to do so.  
Two-tiered systems are, in sum, a rational response to the threats that certain 
authoritarian regimes face. Such systems are resilient, providing adequate protection 
against foreign adversaries and domestic coups. There are powerful reasons for 
anticipating, however, that uprisings can plunge such systems into civil war and provoke 
further post-revolutionary conflicts. This study draws upon Libya’s post-independence 
history to demonstrate two-tiered systems’ heuristic value for assessing the challenges of 
political change in the Middle Eastern and African states with two-tiered systems. We 
                                                 
28 David Latin, ‘The Industrial Organization of Merged Armies’, in Roy Licklider, 
(ed.), New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown UP 2014), 231-43. 
29 Cederman et al., Inequality, Grievances and Civil War, 84-87. 
30 Kristen Harkness, ‘The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and 




employ unique sources—British archival documents from the National Archives (TNA) 
and interviews conducted in Libya—to provide a more detailed account than hitherto 
possible of Libya’s systems’ emergence and impact.    
 
Libya Between Internal and External Threats 
The Libyan state’s creation in 1951 confronted its government with the dilemma 
of how to structure the state’s monopoly of force. King Idris I doubted his ability to 
control a national military. He therefore preferred to rely on his tribally stacked 
paramilitary force, the Cyrenaican Defense Force (CYDEF), and kept the regular military 
small and officered by foreigners. Mounting external threats broke down Idris’ initial 
model for controlling the military in 1956-58. He thereafter developed a two-tiered 
system, wherein an increasingly heavily armed CYDEF counterbalanced an ever-
expanding military. Idris’ two-tiered system sustained his rule until 1969, but the coup 
that overthrew him nearly plunged Libya into civil war.  
The territory known as Libya encompasses three distinct entities: Tripolitania in 
the northwest, Cyrenaica in the northeast and the Fezzan in Libya’s southern deserts. 
Mirroring these geographic divisions, distinct forces shaped each region. Tripolitania was 
deeply influenced by the Ottoman Turks, through the ruling Turkish Qaramanli dynasty 
(until 1835) and then by direct Ottoman rule (until 1911).31 The powerful Sanusiyya, 
meanwhile, eclipsed Turkish influences in Cyrenaica. Founded in the mid-19th century as 
an Islamic revivalist movement, the Sanusiyya built a monastic (zuwaya) network that 
                                                 
31 Ali Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization and 
Resistance, 1830-1932 (New York: SUNY UP 1994), 20-27. 
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became the chief loci for political authority.32 Finally, a dynasty with Moroccan origins 
controlled the Fezzan and eked out a living by taxing trans-Saharan caravans.33  
Libya’s regions are themselves heterogeneous, each inhabited by multiple tribes 
and ethnic minorities. Libya, overall, counts over 140 tribes, belonging to 10 
confederations as well as ethnic Amazigh (Berber), Tuareg and Goran minorities.34 
Libyans themselves view these affiliations as important, with 77 percent claiming that 
they identify with their tribe. Tribes’ role has evolved though, with identities such as 
one’s municipality assuming increased importance at tribes’ expense.35  
Libyan statehood is a recent development compared with these long-standing 
regional and tribal divisions. Tripolitania only conquered Fezzan in 1812; shortly before 
Tripolitania itself fell under Ottoman rule.36 Then, Italian imperialism attached Cyrenaica 
to the other provinces in a process stretching from 1911 until 1931.37 The Italians 
resurrected the classical term Libia to describe these conquests, rendering Libya’s 
boundaries and name legacies of 20th century imperialism. Libyans thus had no precedent 
for self-government within the vast territory bequeathed to them by the Ottoman and 
Italian empires. The customary leader of Cyrenaica’s Sanusiyya—Idris al-Sanusi—
therefore accepted the kingship over a united Libya only with great reluctance.38 
The Libyan monarchy’s foundation in 1951 confronted the new state’s 
government with the challenge of structuring its monopoly on force. Idris himself feared 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 73-102. 
33 Ibid, 28-31. 
34 Emmanuelle Paoletti, ‘Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict’, Mediterranean Politics 
16/2 (2011) 317.  
35 Peter Cole and Fiona Mangan, Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace in Libya 
Today (Washington D.C.: USIP 2016), 8-17. 
36 Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya, 27. 
37 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Second Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2012), 24-34. 
38 Ibid, 34-42. 
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that a military, recruited equitably from Libya’s Tripolitanian majority, would orchestrate 
a coup. He therefore wanted to dispense with a national military and instead rely on 
paramilitary forces stacked with loyal Cyrenaican Bedouin. He depended for his personal 
protection on an 86 man Royal Guard, of whom he recruited 97 percent from these 
Bedouin tribes.39 Idris also possessed a larger force, originally known as the Libyan Arab 
Forces and then renamed CYDEF, which the British organized for him in 1939 and which 
protected the monarchy from domestic opponents.40  
Libya’s Parliament, as well as its British and American allies, pressured Idris into 
establishing an army to defend the country and symbolize its sovereignty.41 Idris 
mistrusted this force from its inception in 1952 since its open recruitment meant that half 
of its rank-and-file would necessarily consist of Tripolitanians. Idris consequently 
endeavored to keep the army small, limiting it to 1,200 personnel.42 Idris also feared 
Libyan officers’ ability to overthrow him and pleaded with friendly powers to lend him 
commanders. Turkey loaned Libya its first Chief of Staff and Iraq then provided the four 
subsequent Chiefs of Staff. Idris privileged these foreigners because their lack of local 
connections disincentivized their interference in politics.43 Idris, finally, secured British 
deployments to Tripoli and Tobruk, from whence the United Kingdom could intervene 
against a coup.44 
                                                 
39 TNA FO 1021/73 Proposed Future Development of the Libyan Royal Guard, 
1952. 
40 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs At War: Military Effectiveness 1948-1991 (Lincoln: 
Nebraska UP 2002), 358-59. 
41 TNA FO 1021/73 Conversation between Ali Jerbi and Oriental Secretary, 6 
March 1952. 
42 TNA FO 1021/102 Libyan Army Progress Report No.4, 1953. 
43 TNA FO 371/131807 The Iraqi Contribution, May 1958. 
44 TNA PREM 13/2758 Anglo-Libyan Treaty Review, 1965.  
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Idris thus ensured that his small foreign-officered army posed little threat. Exterior 
events, however, progressively undermined Idris’ coup-proofing. The 1958 Iraqi coup, 
for example, deprived Idris of his supply of foreign officers. The radical governments that 
followed the Iraqi monarchy’s overthrow opposed Libya’s monarchy on ideological 
grounds and Idris therefore balked at soliciting officers from them.45 Idris therefore 
reluctantly replaced his foreign officers with Libyans drawn from loyal Bedouin tribes. 
The first Chief of Staff—Senussi Latawish—had fought the Italians as a pro-Sanusi 
guerrilla. Following Latawish, the extended Cyrenaican Shelhi clan came to dominate the 
high command.46                 
At the same time as events forced Idris to libyanize his high command, they also 
obliged him to expand the army. Gamel Nasser’s buildup of Egypt’s armed forces from 
1952 onwards and the 1956 destitution of neighboring Tunisia’s Dey made Idris feel 
beleaguered in a changing region. Idris responded by expanding Libya’s army to 5,000 
personnel between 1956 and 1961.47 Fresh pressures however obliged him to expand the 
army further within a decade. The United Kingdom withdrew its garrisons from Tripoli 
and Tobruk in 1965 and informed Idris that Libya would need to defend itself from 1973 
onwards. The catastrophic Arab defeat during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War then drove 
Libyans to demand that their government develop a military capable of contributing to 
the common Arab cause. Idris responded by first authorizing the Army’s expansion to 
15,000 and then, in May 1969, by decreeing the forthcoming conscription of all able-
bodied males.48  
                                                 
45 TNA FO 371/131807 Graham to Watson, 29 July 1958. 
46 TNA FCO 39/442 Military Mission Report, 30 June 1969. 
47 TNA FO 371/119763 Expansion of the Libyan Army, 1956. 
48 TNA FCO 39/442 British Military Mission Progress Report, 30 June 1969. 
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While Idris bowed to the necessity of expanding the army, he also strengthened 
his paramilitary forces as a means of coup-proofing himself. CYDEF, within this context, 
recruited more personnel and began acquiring heavy weaponry, including armored cars 
and artillery, to defeat a military coup.49 Idris next established two specialized CYDEF 
counter-coup forces outside of Tripoli and Beida.50 To provide himself with a final layer 
of defense, Idris then expanded his Royal Bodyguard to 500 personnel. Idris, thus, 
developed a two-tiered system, wherein communally-stacked paramilitaries constituted 
the primary obstacle to the national army orchestrating a coup.   
The balance of power between the Army and CYDEF continued shifting in the 
former’s favor, however, because of less tangible human factors and despite Idris’ largess 
towards CYDEF. The cronyism endemic to CYDEF, where family background was more 
important than professional competence, undermined the force’s efficiency even as it 
assimilated heavier weaponry. American intelligence remarked this decline, observing 
that ‘throughout the 1950’s CYDEF was “a competent and formidable organization”’ but 
that a decade later ‘the general level of morale, discipline, and training… is now low.’51    
CYDEF’s decline coincided with Idris’ increasing inability to govern. Physical 
ailments drove Idris, who turned 79 in 1969, to spend months on end abroad receiving 
curative treatments. Idris’ absences and contradictory statements that he might abdicate 
in favor of the Crown Prince or transform Libya into a Republic fostered a climate of 
intrigue that infected army factions as well. The Shelhi clan, who dominated the high 
command, allegedly planned a palace coup for late 1969.52 The officer corps’ lower 
                                                 
49 TNA FO 371/159169 Arms For Cydef, 23 August 1961.  
50 TNA FCO 39/442 British Military Mission Report, 30 September 1969. 
51 CIA, The Fall of the Libyan Monarchy, 9 September 1969, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-287-1-4-8.pdf (accessed January 
2018). 
52 TNA FCO 39/442 Military Mission Report, 30 September 1969. 
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echelons, filled with resentful Tripolitanians, meanwhile became a hotbed of sedition. 
Soon five junior officer cabals, adhering to radical ideologies ranging from Ba’athism to 
Nasserism, were plotting coups. Twenty-seven year old Captain Gaddafi led one such 
group of 12 officers drawn from marginalized Tripolitanian tribes.53      
This group, termed the Free Officers in imitation of Nasser, struck while Idris was 
away in Turkey on 1 September 1969. The plotters first set upon the CYDEF strike force 
in Beida. Commandeering the 5th Infantry Regiment and arriving by surprise, they seized 
CYDEF’s armored cars without a fight.54 They then arrested senior officers, seized 
airfields and captured telephone exchanges. Surprised and with its leadership imprisoned, 
CYDEF initially failed to resist. Tardily, however, Idris’ paramilitaries stirred. Major 
Abdullah Muftah and his 80 man force of CYDEF armored cars eluded the plotters’ strike 
on Beida and escaped to Tobruk, where he joined up with the Royal Guard. Their 
consolidated force of 600 then thwarted the plotters’ efforts to seize Tobruk.55 
Libya now teetered on the brink of civil war. The pro-Sanusi Barata tribe then 
began raising 5,000 warriors to fight alongside the Guard and CYDEF. Idris’ advisor, 
Omar Shelhi, then met with British officials and requested that they intervene.56 The 
monarchy’s prospects for reversing the coup proved ephemeral though. The monarchy’s 
supporters faced a dilemma in that the institution they hoped to defend already appeared 
doomed. Idris was old and unable to govern, and the plotters had arrested Crown Prince 
Hasan, whom they coerced into recording a speech supporting their revolution.57 Even if 
                                                 
53 Moncef Ouannes, Militaires, Elites et Modernisation dans la Libye 
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pro-Sanusi forces defeated the plotters, the latter would likely execute Hasan, leaving the 
country without a king fit to govern.  
These considerations, along with Britain’s refusal to intervene, broke the 
paramilitaries’ will. When three of the plotters’ regiments advanced on 4 September—
three days after the coup—they met no resistance, with CYDEF and the Guard melting 
into the population. Libya’s monarchy thus fell after 18 years of striving to reconcile the 
regime’s need for an army and that self-same regime’s fear of coups. Idris’ initial instinct 
to dispense with a national military and his subsequent efforts to make do with a miniscule 
one faltered because of Libya’s increasingly fraught environment. Idris’ security then 
depended for more than a decade upon a two-tiered system, wherein his communally-
stacked paramilitaries counterbalanced his growing army.  
 
The Rise of Libya’s Centralized Armed Forces 
Gaddafi and the officers who joined him in overthrowing Idris sought to remodel 
the state’s security institutions. They endeavored to win the military’s loyalty and garner 
public support by using an expanded military to pursue popular policy objectives. Despite 
the largess lavished on the armed forces, Gaddafi never fully trusted his military. He, 
therefore, even during this period, replicated elements of Idris’ two-tiered system by 
creating a Revolutionary Guard as a countercoup force and Revolutionary Committees to 
quell dissent. 
Gaddafi was convinced at his regime’s outset that he needed to strengthen Libya’s 
military. Having himself been propelled to power by officers’ discontent, Gaddafi 
calculated that a military buildup would secure him the armed forces’ loyalty. Moreover, 
Gaddafi and his colleagues in Libya’s Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) feared an 
uprising in Cyrenaica, where the monarchy’s supporters remained numerous and armed. 
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Finally, the regime’s ‘radical’ foreign policy—combining militant opposition to Israel, 
anti-imperialism and pan-Arabism—necessitated the acquisition of powerful military 
capabilities. Ideally, Gaddafi reasoned, expanding Libya’s military and then effectively 
using it to achieve popular objectives would secure both the military’s loyalty and the 
population’s support.58  
Nevertheless, having themselves achieved power through a coup, Gaddafi and the 
RCC recognized that the military posed a potential threat. Libya’s new regime therefore 
refused to formally establish a Defense Ministry (except for one three-month period) and 
purged the officer corps.59 Gaddafi considered Ba’athist officers his most likely 
opponents and imprisoned them. He then pushed pro-Sanusi Cyrenaicans from the officer 
corps, retiring 16 and transferring 160 from military to civil service positions. Gaddafi’s 
culling of the officer corps resulted in the dismissal of every officer ranked above colonel 
and many more junior as well.60 
Gaddafi’s regime vastly enhanced the military’s size and firepower at the same 
time as purging Libya’s officer corps. Gaddafi raised defense spending to an annual $140 
million, which fueled a 50 percent increase in the army’s size during the regime’s first 
year and the air forces’ eleven-fold (from ten to 110 combat aircraft) over a slightly longer 
period. Libya, before long, was spending ten percent of its GNP on defense. Coupled with 
growing oil revenues, Gaddafi’s high defense expenditures rendered the country a 
principal destination for arms exports.61  
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Idris’ overthrow before his conscription decree’s implementation meant that it fell 
upon Gaddafi to re-impose male conscription in 1977 and then authorize (but never 
implement) female conscription in 1984 to provide personnel to operate this weaponry.62 
He also paid for support from a large cadre of Soviet and Warsaw Pact advisors to 
compensate for Libya’s dearth of qualified instructors. Through these policies, Libya’s 
armed forces expanded by 1988 to formidable proportions. With 85,000 personnel, 3,000 
tanks and 555 combat aircraft, Gaddafi’s military was 12 times larger than the monarchy’s 
had been and much better equipped.63 Libya arguably possessed forces as large and 
modern as the state could support at this point. 
Nevertheless, despite Gaddafi’s lavishing resources on the military, he never fully 
trusted the institution. Cabals of officers indeed conspired to overthrow Gaddafi on three 
occasions—1969, 1970 and 1975—during the regime’s first years.64 Gaddafi therefore 
sought to ensure himself against a coup even as he expanded the military.65 He did this 
primarily by developing a tribal powerbase bound to the regime. Because Gaddafi’s tribe, 
the Gaddafa, was too small to provide the requisite personnel, he orchestrated alliances 
with tribes that historically intermarried with the Gaddafa.  
Senior members of the Gaddafa therefore concluded a formal inter-tribal covenant 
with Libya’s largest tribe, the Warfallah, in late 1975. Gaddafi also privileged several 
additional tribes, such as the Maghariba.66 Members of these tribes received preferential 
appointments within the military and dominated its most prestigious career paths, such as 
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air force pilots and special forces officers. Ambitious members of less privileged tribes 
nevertheless pursued military careers because the military’s expansion created 
opportunities and tribally motivated discrimination remained less acute in the military 
than other state bureaucracies.67  
Gaddafi therefore instituted other coup-proofing practices to compensate for his 
limited ability to stack the regular officer corps. Gaddafi created paramilitary bodies, such 
as his Revolutionary Committees (established 1979), to suppress political discontent, and 
the 2,000-man Revolutionary Guards (established 1981) to prevent a military coup.68 He 
also formed a People’s Army—a part-time militia of 45,000 that received training from 
Cuban and Palestinian instructors—to serve as a counterweight to the army.69 Gaddafi, 
likewise, rotated officers frequently between units and garrisons to prevent their 
developing connections with local leaders and developed his invasive Military Secret 
Service to root out sedition within the officer corps.70  
Gaddafi’s foreign policy ambitions led him to send Libya’s armed forces into 
harm’s way after building them into the country’s most professional and well-resourced 
institution. Libya’s armed forces fought Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War; faced 
off against Egypt in a limited conflict in 1977; defended Uganda’s government against 
Tanzania in 1979; intervened in Chad between 1978 and 1987; and repeatedly confronted 
the United States in the Gulf of Sidra.71 Libyan forces accomplished notable feats, 
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including sustaining expeditionary forces far from Libya, defeating Tanzania at the battle 
of Lukuya, and launching offensives (1978, 1980-81 and 1983) that overwhelmed their 
Chadian opponents.72  
Libya’s interventions, however, ended in strategic failure and military defeat. 
Libya’s military was beaten by Egypt, its forces crushed in Uganda and Chad, and its air 
and naval forces humiliated in the Gulf of Sidra.73 Gaddafi’s ambitions led him to attempt 
impossible endeavors against superior adversaries, including Egypt, France and the 
United States. Gaddafi’s foisting large quantities of cutting-edged weaponry on an 
expanding military—whose recruits lacked adequate training—likewise overburdened 
the military. British intelligence diagnosed this inability to assimilate weaponry, arguing 
‘on current performance the Libyans would in practice have great difficulty in 
assimilating and making use of the greater part of this equipment: whatever is supplied 
would be likely to suffer a high rate of unserviceability through misuse and neglect.’74  
Gaddafi’s policy of buying loyalty with lavish resources and leading his military 
into popular wars thus miscarried because Gaddafi failed to forge a sufficiently efficient 
tool and committed his fledgling forces to conflicts for which they were inadequate.   
 
The Decline of Libya’s Centralized Armed Forces 
Gaddafi’s early model for securing the military’s loyalty collapsed in the 1990s. 
Defeats abroad and economic decline at home halted Gaddafi’s military buildup. Two 
challenges—an abortive military coup and a protracted Islamist insurgency—exacerbated 
his distrust of the military. Gaddafi responded by accentuating the two-tiered aspects of 
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Libya’s system. He simultaneously expanded his tribally stacked units and fragmented 
the regular military, which nonetheless remained large as a hedge against external 
aggression.  
International sanctions, economic stagnation and the authoritarian nature of 
Libya’s regime fueled discontent during the 1990s. The armed forces were susceptible to 
these social forces because they were one of the state’s most representative bodies. 
Officers from the privileged Warfallah tribe therefore plotted to overthrow Gaddafi in 
1993. Unlike earlier conspiracies, this plot struck at the core of Gaddafi’s security 
apparatus. Gaddafi hitherto considered Warfallah loyal and they comprised a majority 
within the officer corps. This plot’s existence therefore shocked Gaddafi even though his 
security services discovered and suppressed it.75 
An Islamist insurgency then erupted in 1995. Founded by Libyan veterans of the 
anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) appealed to 
Cyrenaicans, who resented the government’s discrimination against Eastern Libya.76 Not 
coincidentally, LIFG personnel were older (approximately 30) and better educated (most 
university graduates) than members of other Islamist insurgencies. The LIFG’s 2,500 
members applied the lessons they had learned in Afghanistan to wage a guerrilla war 
around Benghazi, Derma and Jebel al-Akhdar. The military’s broad recruitment meant 
that many soldiers had kin amongst the rebels and hailed from regions struck by 
governmental repression.77  
Gaddafi therefore suspected military personnel of sympathizing with the LIFG 
and consequently strengthened his paramilitaries at the armed forces’ expense. He began 
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by ordering his small Revolutionary Guard to disarm army units in Cyrenaica, which he 
then exiled to outposts in the Sahara.78 Shortly, thereafter, Gaddafi ordered most of the 
armed forces’ heavy weaponry and munitions to be relocated to Sirte, which was 
Gaddafi’s birthplace and the city most devoted to the regime.79 Gaddafi’s policy of 
weakening the military reached its climax in 1995 when he proclaimed the armed forces’ 
dissolution.80 
While Gaddafi did not actually abolish the military, he dissolved their higher 
organizational structures, including the divisional level of command and the general staff, 
leaving the military an amorphous collection of small units. Gaddafi consequently 
relegated generals with 30 years of experience to commanding derisory formations of 100 
soldiers. He likewise restricted even these units from training with live ammunition, 
prohibited personnel from carrying side arms and imposed travel restrictions on off-duty 
officers.81 These measures proved vexatious to officers and inimical to efficiency, 
precipitating a decline in military morale and training. 
Gaddafi reinforced his paramilitary forces at the same time as he weakened the 
regular military, accentuating Libya’s two-tiered system. He began by expanding the 
Revolutionary Guard from 2,000 to 40,000 personnel, arming members of the 
Revolutionary Committees and developing para-military police units staffed by reliable 
Tripolitanians. He also bolstered these forces with foreign mercenaries.82 Together these 
pro-government forces quelled the LIFGs’s rebellion by 1998.  
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Gaddafi’s government began explicitly creating tribally stacked units after the 
LIFG’s defeat. Gaddafi considered kinship the surest guarantee of loyalty and therefore 
gave three sons—Khamis, Moatassim and Saadi—brigades recruited from loyal tribes. 
The most formidable of these was Khamis’ 32nd Brigade, which possessed 10,000 
personnel and ample heavy weaponry. Moatassim, however, played an equally significant 
role presiding over Libya’s National Security Commission.83 Gaddafi granted a cousin, 
Barani Ishkal, command of a fourth brigade, the Al-Magarief Brigade, which maintained 
order in Libya’s capital.84 Other Gaddafi cousins, Ahmed Gadhaf al-Dam and Khalifa 
Hanaish, also played important roles.85 
Gaddafi employed matrimonial alliances to further this policy of leveraging 
kinship to protect his regime. Gaddafi, for example, married one of his sons to the 
daughter of his Revolutionary Committees’ director, Khuwaylidi Hamidi.86 Gaddafi also 
married his sister-in-law to his intelligence chief Abdallah al-Sanusi, and his daughter, 
Aisha, to a cousin, Ahmed al-Gaddafi al-Qahsi, who commanded another security 
brigade.87 Gaddafi made further dispositions to hire mercenaries and arm loyal tribes to 
bolster these security brigades in the event of significant unrest.88 
Libya thus possessed a full-fledged two-tiered system by the 2011 revolution’s 
eve. Small numbers of stacked units provided the regime’s primary defense against 
domestic threats, while Libya’s larger regular forces suffered from weak cohesion 
because of poor funding and Gaddafi’s deliberate coup-proofing. 
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Mass Protests and Security Sector Fragmentation 
Although Gaddafi’s two-tiered system enabled him to cling to power through the 
1990s crises, it helped transform Libya’s 2011 uprising into a civil war. Gaddafi’s stacked 
units fought tenaciously, but lacked the size to repress nationwide uprisings. Gaddafi’s 
two-decade policy of emasculating Libya’s regular forces meanwhile rendered them 
incapable of playing a cohesive role either for or against the government. The military 
therefore fractured, with some joining the rebellion and others sitting out the conflict. 
Libya’s civil war therefore devolved into a conflict between stacked security units and 
three categories of anti-regime militia—units led by military personnel, those raised 
without military participation, and those formed by Islamists—that rose up to oppose 
them.  
Gaddafi’s dividing and weakening of Libya’s army led the latter to fracture once 
civil war broke out. Untrusted by the dictator, Gaddafi hesitated to provide the army with 
the ammunition needed to combat an insurrection. When he eventually ordered General 
Al Fatah Younes and the Army’s non-stacked special forces—Al Sai’qa—to repress 
demonstrators on 20 February, military personnel prevaricated before defecting two days 
later.89 Military personnel throughout Libya thereafter abandoned their barracks and 
individually decided what course of action to adopt. Many joined the rebellion in 
localities such as Zintan and Eastern Libya.90 In other areas, such as Misrata, military 
personnel adopted a wait-and-see attitude, remaining at home while the war raged. 
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Military garrisons, finally, remained loyal in pro-regime strongholds such as Beni Walid 
and Sirte.91  
This military fragmentation left the field clear for three categories of armed 
group—those directed by military officers, those dominated by civilians and those 
organized by Islamists—to combat Gaddafi’s security brigades. A host of militias 
emerged within each category, with as many as 1,700 groups existing by war’s end.92 
Each of the revolt’s four foyers—Benghazi, Misrata, Derna and the Nafousa Mountains—
produced, however, a different combination of armed groups. 
Considering that opposition to Gaddafi was always most acute in Cyrenaica, 
which had been the monarchy’s powerbase, this region was first to rebel. The revolt began 
in January 2011 with discontented inhabitants seizing vacant apartment buildings. When 
the regime responded with brutality, anti-regime protests escalated to a full-scale 
rebellion. Cyrenaica’s elites and principal tribes rapidly joined this rebellion. Table 1, 
below, provides an illustration of Benghazi’s militias’ composition, based on data 
provided by Benghazi’s National Transitional Council on the 345 members of the city’s 




Combatants  Percentage 
      
Military and Security Forces 71 20.6 
Businessmen, business owners and liberal professions 94 27.2 
Employees 38 11.0 
Unemployed 30 8.7 
Civil servants 43 12.5 
Student 54 15.7 
Other 7 2.0 
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no information available 8 2.3 
      
Total 345 100 
Table 1. Socio-Economic Backgrounds of Benghazi Militiamen. 
 
As may be seen, Benghazi’s militias featured large numbers of military personnel 
(21 percent) as well as societal elites, such as businesspersons (27 percent). Cyrenaica’s 
rebels likewise benefited from the most significant military defections, including Interior 
Minister General Younes, General Suleiman Mahmoud Obeidi and General Khalifa 
Haftar.94 Entire garrisons near Benghazi—in Tobruk, the Jebal Akhdar and al-Marj—
followed these generals into rebellion. More symbolically, two air force officers from 
Benghazi sacrificed themselves in mid-March to thwart the regime’s offensive, one 
crashing kamikaze-style into Gaddafi’s Tripoli residence and the other conducting 
suicidally brave ground attack missions.95 Military professionals thus led many Benghazi 
militias and enabled them to organize two-week training sessions for volunteers.96  
While professionals directed most Benghazi militias, an opposing Islamist current 
emerged as well, tapping into the social networks that formerly sent Benghazi’s youth to 
fight for the LIFG and Al Qaeda Iraq. Benghazi previously sent more jihadists abroad 
than any African city besides Derna and now spawned redoubtable Islamist militias, such 
as Ismail al-Sallabi’s 17th Brigade and the Ansar al-Shariah movement. LIFG veterans 
themselves founded the more moderate Omar Mukhtar Brigade, whose rigorous training 
earned it a reputation for effectiveness.97 Islamist and military dominated militias 
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downplayed their antagonisms during the war, but they nonetheless erupted into violence 
when Islamists assassinated General Younes, Cyrenaica’s senior rebel commander.98   
While Benghazi was the revolt’s epicenter, the western Libyan city of Misrata 
proved more important to the revolution’s victory. Erupting several days after Benghazi’s 
uprising, Misrata evicted the regime’s forces by 23 February. Gaddafi, however, made a 
more prolonged effort to retake Misrata than any other locale, plunging Misrata into six 
months of warfare, from 24 February to 20 August 2011. This period forged Misrata’s 
militiamen into a force observers rated the ‘most tenacious and effective of all’ anti-
Gaddafi forces.99 
Misrata’s militias earned reputations as the Revolution’s most effective despite 
their lacking Benghazi’s leavening of military professionals. Misrata’s affluence and 
even-handed treatment by Gaddafi led Misratan military personnel to retire into private 
life. Officers therefore neither commanded nor trained Misrata’s militias even though 
14,000 Misratans fought against Gaddafi during the Battle of Misrata and up to 40,000 
joined by war’s end.100 Rather, training was haphazard and militias elected whichever 
leaders they considered bravest. Militia leaders then collectively negotiated agreements 
about where their groups would fight.101  
While military personnel eschewed Misrata’s militias, the city’s underprivileged 
played a correspondingly greater role. According to data provided by Misrata’s Shaheed 
Katiba, fully 36 percent of combatants were unemployed before the war, while less than 
one percent had military backgrounds.102 Misrata’s dearth of defectors meant, moreover, 
                                                 
98 Hilsum, Sandstorm, 265-67. 
99 Ibid, 214. 
100 Brian McQuinn, Armed Groups in Libya: Typology and Roles (Geneva: Small 
Arms Survey 2012) 1-4. 
101 Interview with Commandant Lofti, Shaheed Katiba, 26 February 2012. 
102 Membership Rosters, Shaheed Katiba, February 2012.  
31 
 
that weapons handling skills were in particular demand. Members of Misrata’s criminal 
underworld exploited this need to attain prominence in the city’s militias, eventually 
commanding three formations.103  
Other groups’ participation counterbalanced, however, the roles played by 
Misrata’s unemployed and criminals. An industrial engineer, Tahir Ba’ur, coordinated 
the city’s defense plan as Secretary of the Misratan Union of Revolutionaries.104 
Industrial workers likewise played consequential roles. Employees of Misrata’s 
metalworking factories, for example, joined militias and established workshops to modify 
captured weaponry, welding cannons to pickup trucks and adapting air-launched rockets 
to be fired from the ground.105  Privileged groups also participated, leading one journalist 
to remark, ‘They are largely a white-collar army of teachers, mechanics, university 
professors, dentists, doctors, shopkeepers, and lots and lots of students.’106  
Table 2, below, illustrates Misrata’s combatants’ backgrounds, based on data 
provided by the city’s second largest militia.107  
 
Profession Backgrounds No. % 
      
Military and Security Forces 1 0.3 
Businessmen, business owners and liberal professions 93 32.5 
Employees 26 9.1 
Unemployed 103 36.0 
Departments/Government/Administration 21 7.3 
Student 27 9.4 
no information available 0 0.0 
Other 15 5.2 
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Total 286 100 
Table 2. Socio-Economic Backgrounds of Misrata Militiamen. 
 
Misrata’s dearth of military professionals prevented Misratans from developing 
institutions for providing volunteers with training before sending them to the front.108 As 
one journalist remarked, ‘[n]ot one I talk to [in Misrata] has had any training.’109 Despite 
their lack of professional cadres, Misrata’s militias nevertheless developed an esprit de 
corps that impressed observers.110 
The eastern city of Derna, meanwhile, developed militias with a decidedly 
Islamist character. Derna was the LIFG’s epicenter and its disaffected youth later 
followed the path of foreign jihad. Derna, indeed, provided more foreign fighters to Al 
Qaeda Iraq than any other city in the Islamic world.111 A trained cadre of leaders, 
moreover, existed ready to command once the civil war began since many LIFG cadres 
had either escaped into exile or been released in Gaddafi’s 2010 amnesty for Islamists. 
LIFG veterans, such as Sami al-Sa'idi and Abdul-Hakim al-Hasadi, therefore provided 
militias with seasoned leadership.112 
The rebellion’s fourth foyer—the Nafousa Mountains—developed as a 
microcosm of the rebellion, with distinct militias dominated by military personnel, 
civilians and Islamists. The region’s largest city, Zintan, traditionally provided the army 
with large numbers of officers. That city’s revolt therefore assumed a military character. 
Special forces Colonel Muhammad al-Madani led the city’s council while Major Usama 
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Juwaili presided over Zintan’s Military Council.113 Zintan’s officers organized volunteers 
into seven well-trained brigades, totaling 4,000 fighters.114  
Outside Zintan, most of the Nafousa’s inhabitants are Amazigh (or Berbers) who 
quickly rallied to the rebellion.115 Historic marginalization within the armed forces meant 
that Amazigh militias featured few soldiers and many civilians. Former LIFG leaders 
meanwhile established a presence in the Nafusa as well. Mahdi al-Hurrati, a Libyan 
Islamist residing in Ireland, infiltrated the Nafusa where he established the Tripoli 
Brigade and gradually assembled 1,500 fighters from returning exiles and Tripolitanians 
fleeing to the mountains.116      
Although the 2011 rebellion developed as a series of more-or-less unconnected 
uprisings, Libya’s regime lacked forces strong and flexible enough to conquer rebel 
foyers. Gaddafi’s security units lacked the sheer size to quell widespread uprisings and 
they therefore arrived piecemeal and failed to deliver blows powerful enough to conquer 
rebel bastions. Gaddafi’s forces, indeed, only retook one municipality—Zawiya—and 
they achieved this only by committing airpower and Khamis’ elite 32nd Brigade.117 In 
Misrata’s crucial case, the regime delayed its counteroffensive for three weeks, until 
Khamis finished retaking Zawiya and mercenaries had arrived, giving Misratans time to 
organize. Gaddafi even then lacked sufficient brigades for this battle and although he 
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committed 11,000 combatants to the six-month struggle, only 400 were professional 
soldiers.118 
Gaddafi’s failure to crush the rebellion swiftly condemned him to lose slowly to 
it. Rebels grew in strength and NATO airpower prevented Gaddafi’s security brigades 
from using heavy weapons. The regime forces’ gradual exhaustion and the rebels’ 
mounting strength then reached a tipping point, catalyzing the simultaneous collapse of 
pro-Gaddafi forces in Misrata, Cyrenaica and the Nafousa. Rebels from the Nafousa and 
an ad hoc flotilla of Misratans aboard small boats exploited the regime’s disarray to 
swarm into Tripoli. Many too timorous to join the uprising so long as the war’s issue was 
uncertain now swelled the rebellion’s ranks in its hour of victory.119  
 
Civil War Redux 
Although the rebellion’s triumph was total, Gaddafi’s two-tiered system created 
the pre-conditions for the anarchy that later engulfed Libya. Post-revolutionary transitions 
are possible in states where some form of governmental monopoly on force persists. This 
monopoly can be provided either by revolutionary armies—as occurred in Communist 
China and Cuba—supplanting prior regimes’ armed forces or by a state’s existing military 
shifting its loyalties, as occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. Libya, however, belongs 
to a third category, wherein upheavals generate a security sector with multiple competing 
actors. 
All three militia categories—military-led, civilian and Islamist—demanded a 
central role in the post-Gaddafi security sector. Regular officers emphasized their 
professional qualifications and wartime service. Military careerists presided over the 
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revolution’s high command in Cyrenaica and their reconstituted armed forces counted 
8,000 personnel immediately after the conflict.120 Western Libya’s Misratan and 
Amazigh militias, meanwhile, argued that they played greater roles in the war’s 
denouement and that prior affiliation with Gaddafi tainted professional officers. Despite 
their small numbers—the LIFG numbered only 200 pre-war members—prior jihads and 
favorable media coverage burnished Islamists’ military reputation.121 
These three groups sought to consolidate their positions. Career officer and 
Zintani commander Usama Juwaili, for example, took over the Defense Ministry.122 
Another career officer, Yusuf al-Mangush, won appointment as Chief of Staff.  LIFG 
veteran Abdul-Hakim Bilhajj, meanwhile, finagled his appointment as chair of the Tripoli 
Military Council.123  Finally, a Misratan, Fawzi ‘Abdul’Aal, became Libya’s Interior 
Minister and advanced his city’s militias’ cause.124 Libya’s three categories of armed 
actors thus legitimated their forces and state resources flowed to each. Libya’s Defense 
Ministry financed the regular forces’ reconstitution and employed Zintani militias. 
Libya’s government, meanwhile, funded Misratan and Islamist militias, which federated 
into two structures: the Libyan Shield Forces and Libyan Revolutionary Operations 
Room.125  
Remnants of Gaddafi’s stacked units complicated negotiations between these 
forces. Stacked units had withdrawn, with their weapons, to Bani Walid after Gaddafi’s 
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fall. The city’s inhabitants sympathized with these units since they had recruited heavily 
there. In January 2012, these remnants struck the National Transition Council’s (NTC) 
garrison, overrunning the base. Witnesses claim fighters unfurled Gaddafi-era flags and 
distributed pro-Gaddafi propaganda, but Bani Walid’s elders claimed that their revolt 
merely asserted the city’s self-governance. Anti-Gaddafi militias, rather than Libya’s 
disorganized military, responded to this crisis and coerced Bani Walid into a ceasefire.126 
Former pro-Gaddafi fighters continued to strike out though, killing and capturing militia 
personnel. Misrata’s militias retaliated, against Chief-of-Staff al-Mangush’s orders, by 
besieging Bani Walid. A month-long battle ensued, during which militias disregarded the 
military chain-of-command and the military disingenuously claimed credit for Bani 
Walid’s eventual fall.127     
Governments initially planned to undo this fragmented security order by 
integrating militias and the military into a single entity. Libya’s NTC first sought to induct 
50,000 militiamen into the military, creating a balance between regulars and ex-militia 
personnel. Military officers and militia leaders alike opposed this project however. Al-
Mangush therefore pushed the government to revise its objective downwards to 6,000 
militiamen, leaving the regular military essentially unaltered by militiamen.128 A similar 
2013 project to combine 20,000 regular personnel and militia fighters into a General 
Purpose Force (GPF) likewise failed. Half of the militiamen dropped out of the GPF 
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training program, prompting the military’s Chief of Staff to lobby for the project’s 
cancellation.129   
These integration projects’ failure exposed Libya to security dilemmas, as each 
faction viewed others’ actions in a zero-sum light. Juwaili’s Zintan militias, for example, 
responded to Bilhajj’s leadership over Tripoli’s Militia Council by detaining and 
humiliating him in November 2011. Although Bilhajj remained in office until May 2012, 
this demonstration of his vulnerability degraded Bilhajj’s authority. Bilhajj’s declining 
role and Islamists’ defeat in Libya’s 2012 elections galvanized Islamists to challenge the 
state.  Fifteen Islamist militias demonstrated their strength by parading heavy weapons 
through Benghazi in June 2012. Benghazi’s Ansar al-Sharia Brigade, then attacked 
Benghazi’s US Consulate in September and assassinated Benghazi’s police chief in 
November. 
The Islamist challenge in Benghazi drew Libya’s other groups into the fray. 
Libya’s government first ordered militias belonging to the Libyan Shield Forces (LSF) to 
suppress Ansar al-Sharia. Islamists, however, commanded certain LSF militias and 
preferred to collude with, rather than fight Ansar al-Sharia. Misrata’s powerful civilian-
based militias, meanwhile, coerced the legislature into signing a political isolation law in 
March 2013 that expelled Gaddafi-era officers from the armed forces.130 Libya’s 
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government then inflicted another blow on the military by pressuring Chief of Staff al-
Mangush into resigning over Benghazi’s growing anarchy. 131  
Militiamen belonging to the Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room (LROR) 
then exploited Libya’s malaise to abduct Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in October 2013. 
Defense Minister Juwaili and his Zintan militias thwarted this alleged coup, surrounding 
Zeidan’s captors and obliging them to release him.132  Zeidan then renewed his efforts to 
quell Ansar al-Sharia by dispatching army special forces—Al-Saiqa—in November 2013. 
Al-Saiqa, however, proved no more successful than the LSF, fueling perceptions of 
Libya’s ungovernability.  
The security dilemmas opposing Libya’s armed groups escalated into civil war in 
2014. General Khalifa Haftar, a high-level defector from Gaddafi’s army, became 
convinced that Libya’s armed forces and affiliated Zintani militias should take control of 
the country. His first coup attempt, however, turned to farce. Haftar commandeered a 
television station in February 2014 and proclaimed that he was dissolving the Libyan 
legislature and would oversee a caretaker government. No military units rallied to Haftar 
and the government rejected his demands. Haftar, however, counted enough sympathizers 
to avoid arrest.133  
Haftar proceeded to win the armed forces and Zintani militias to his cause through 
‘town hall meetings’ with their commanders. He then proclaimed ‘Operation Dignity’ in 
May 2014 and his forces attacked in Benghazi and Tripoli. Despite successes, Operation 
Dignity faltered when Libya’s other factions united against Haftar. Western Libya’s 
civilian-based militias, including the powerful Misrata brigades and the Nafousa’s 
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Amazigh militias, turned against the pro-Haftar army and Zintan brigades. In Benghazi, 
meanwhile, Ansar al-Sharia allied with the Libyan Shield Force militias to combat Haftar 
under the banner of the Revolutionaries' Shura Council. The loose Libya-wide alliance of 
anti-Haftar militias labelled their counteroffensive ‘Operation Dawn.’134 
Neither the Dawn nor the Dignity coalition possessed the force to win. Dignity 
made inroads, but was then defeated in Benghazi and Tripoli. Dawn’s counteroffensive 
then stalled after Misrata’s militias evicted Zintan’s brigades from Tripoli’s Airport and 
the Benghazi Shura Council seized Al-Saiqa’s headquarters, which left Haftar with 
Tobruk and Zintan. The three categories of armed group to emerge from the Libyan 
revolution—military affiliated groups, civilian militias and Islamist forces—thus 
partitioned Libya within three years of Gaddafi’s overthrow.   
  
Conclusion 
Two-tiered systems provide a rational response to the challenges confronting 
many authoritarian leaders. That Idris and Gaddafi both eventually embraced two-tiered 
systems, despite initially favoring other practices, testifies to these systems’ utility. While 
these systems protected regimes from modest domestic and international threats, they 
increased the likelihood of political change triggering civil war. Libya barely averted a 
first civil war, between CYDEF and the army, in 1969. The protests of 2011 then 
catalyzed a civil war wherein Gaddafi’s stacked units fought for the regime and the 
regular military splintered. This war’s conclusion bequeathed post-revolutionary Libya a 
fragmented security order. While regular officers and irregular militiamen mistrusted one 
another, stacked units’ remnants challenged the new order whenever they could. These 
                                                 




dynamics, themselves legacies of Gaddafi’s two-tiered system, plunged Libya into its 
2014 civil war. 
Although they differ as to their precise pathways, several Arab states—Iraq, Syria 
and Yemen—also adopted two-tiered systems and later succumbed to civil war due, in 
part, to these systems. In Syria and Iraq, it was imperial powers—France and the Ottoman 
Empire—that recruited minority communities that they anticipated would be particularly 
loyal into the military. Once members of these communities seized power—Alawites in 
Syria and Sunis from Salah al-Din province in Iraq—they stacked elite units (e.g. their 
Republican Guards and Special Forces) with their compatriots.135 In Yemen, it was 
contrarily President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih who built-up elite units, such as the Republican 
Guard, Presidential Guard and Special Forces, with members of his Sahani tribe, rather 
than the southern tribes that hitherto dominated Yemen’s Army.136  
These systems, despite disparate origins, contributed to the wars that later wracked 
each state. Syria’s civil war began, for example, in 2011 with the army fragmenting and 
stacked units fighting for the regime. In Yemen’s case, stacked and regular units 
destabilized the state through their maneuvers following Salih’s ouster. Iraq’s stacked 
units, finally, acted as spoilers following Saddam Hussein’s fall and regular officers 
followed them after John Bremer dissolved Iraq’s regular army. Although many regimes 
with two-tiered systems, including Saudi Arabia and numerous African states, have not 
experienced civil wars, these states have also not experienced the mass protests and 
regime changes whereby two-tiered systems become vectors for civil war. 
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Two-tiered systems’ provision of robust short-term security for regimes, yet 
negative long-term impact on states’ ability to accommodate political change, renders 
them toxic for states’ development. Discouraging governments from adopting such 
systems will be difficult, however, since regimes will likely discount the long-term civil 
war risks that their societies bare as an adequate price to pay for the comparatively high 
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